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Abstract
This paper addresses the issue of the positive observed relationship be-
tween GDP and HIV prevalence in Sub-Saharan Africa. We examine the
role of the volatility of GDP per capita in lowering the incentives to invest
in self-protection and, empirically, in the spread of the epidemic. Using a
panel dataset of Sub-Saharan African countries over the 1990-2007 time pe-
riod and a dynamic panel data framework, a more unstable GDP distribution
is found to accelerate the spread of AIDS. The positive relationship between
HIV prevalence and economic volatility is robust to the inclusion of additional
control variables and to the denition of the measure of GDP volatility.
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11 Introduction
Over the past 25 years, public policies to ght AIDS have been focused on increasing
the supply of self-protective measures such as providing condoms either at subsidized
price or for free, and providing information about the risk of HIV-transmission. This
type of policy is ecient under two implicit assumptions. The rst assumption is
that the risk of being HIV-infected is driven by ignorance and misfortune, meaning
that people get infected by HIV only if they are ignorant about the risk they take
during an unprotected sexual intercourse. Secondly this type of policy assumes
that as soon as self-protective devices become available, people will start to use
them. Looking backwards, the evidence suggests that the epidemic of HIV/AIDS
is still spreading among African countries despite the improved level of knowledge
and the increased access to condoms, implying that HIV-infection is not only due
to ignorance but might also be driven by low incentives to invest in self-protection
and to change one's sexual behavior towards safer practices. The same pattern is
found in the literature on road safety devices showing that as the risk of accidents
decreases with the introduction of airbag and seat belts, people start driving faster,
counteracting the eect on risk and leading to no radical fall in the number of road
accidents nor in road mortality (Peltzman, 1975; Evans and Graham, 1991; Peterson
et al, 1994; Sen and Mizzen, 2007).
The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa exhibits complex patterns that contradict
standard microeconomic theory that would argue that educated and wealthy people
should be less likely to be HIV-infected. Its relation to income is puzzling because
worldwide the epidemic aects poorer countries while amongst Sub-Saharan Africa
the richer ones experience the greater prevalence. UNAIDS (2008; 2009) estimates
of HIV prevalence provide some insights about these two assertions. In 2008, 0.8% of
the population around the world was living with HIV (UNAIDS, 2009). While only
0.3% and 0.6% of the adult population were HIV-infected in Western and Central
Europe and North America respectively, the prevalence rate reached 5.2% in Sub-
Saharan Africa in 2008. By contrast, from UNAIDS (2008), the HIV prevalence rates
within Sub-Saharan Africa reveal that the richest regions are the most aected by
the epidemic. In 2007 the HIV prevalence rate among the adult population was
16.36% in Southern Africa (GDP per capita1: 4,584.6), 4.06% in Central Africa
(5,694.3), 2.51% in East Africa (1,215.9) and 1.79% in West Africa (1,110.8). A
1Data source: World Development Indicators (2008)
2series of studies documents the sensitivity of the HIV/AIDS epidemic to income at
both macroeconomic and microeconomic levels and conrms the positive relation
within Africa. At the same time, developing countries and particularly countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa have vulnerable economies and experience frequent uctuations
in income.
This paper addresses the issue of the positive relationship between income and
the spread of the epidemic by taking into account income uncertainty, a variable
omitted from the current literature that is found to play a signicant role in the
epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa. The bottom line is that in Africa, the widespread
instability and the lack of protection against the occurrence of exogenous risks and
against their negative consequences might inuence the individual choice and atti-
tudes towards the risk of infection, and namely, might reduce the value people grant
to the risk of infection. Individuals face so many risks in their everyday life that
actually they might not be concerned in taking one additional and deliberated risk,
even though the cost of protection is low and self-protective devices are available.
Only a few papers consider HIV-related risky behaviors as a deliberated choice
made by the individual (e.g. Geoard and Philipson (1996), Kremer (1996), Clark
and Vencatachellum (2003), Oster (2009)). From this respect, this paper is very
close to Oster (2009) that investigates how individual response to HIV risk varies
according to non HIV mortality risk and income. Here we are interested in the
eect of income risk in reducing the incentives to self-protect against the risk of
HIV-infection and to a macroeconomic test of this relationship.
Firstly, this paper presents a model of rational choice between self-protection and
exposure to the risk of HIV-infection and highlights how income uncertainty alters
the incentive to invest in self-protection. We nd that for a given average income,
the presence of income uncertainty induces the agent to be more likely to engage in
HIV-related risky behavior, and even more so when income risk increases. Secondly,
using a panel dataset of Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1990-2007,
we investigate the empirical relationship between GDP per capita instability and
HIV prevalence in a dynamic panel model, and show that a one-standard deviation
increase in the GDP volatility leads to a rise in HIV prevalence by between 0.32 and
0.43 percentage point.
Traditionally, the empirical analysis between income and prevalence is based on
individual or country cross-sections. Microeconometric evidence suggests for a cou-
ple of African countries that rich individuals are more likely to be HIV-infected than
3their counterparts. Lachaud (2007) provides a detailed study of the determinants
of HIV-infection in Burkina Faso. Using the Demographic and Health Survey col-
lected in 2003, he shows that the probability of being HIV-infected increases with
non monetary welfare, proxied by an index of physical assets. Distinguishing men
and women, de Walque (2006) does not conrm the positive relation found in the
case of Burkina Faso but he validates this pattern in Cameroon for both males and
females and in Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania where rich women are found more likely
to be infected than the poor. Kazianga (2004) and Luke (2006) give some insights
into two channels through which wealth might be related to a higher risk of HIV-
infection. It is documented that in Sub-Saharan Africa, beyond transactions with
commercial sex workers, money and gifts are driving most extramarital or casual sex.
A rich man seems more vulnerable due to his potentially extended sexual network.
The role of transfers is all the more crucial considering that Luke (2006) points out a
negative relationship between transfers and condom use in informal relationships in
urban Kenya. On the other hand, Kazianga (2004) demonstrates that the demand
for casual sex increases with wealth for urban men in Burkina Faso and rural men
in Guinea and Mali.
Cross-country empirical works have documented the positive relationship be-
tween income and the state of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in developing countries, and
with a special focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. Bonnel (2000) tests for the role of
growth in GDP per capita on HIV prevalence for 60 developing countries and nds
that its eect is positive but not statistically signicant. Zanakis et al (2007) test for
the same hypothesis using cross sections of 151 countries and show that the number
of adults aged 15-49 living with HIV/AIDS and the number of AIDS-related deaths
among adults and children are both positively related to the gross national product.
In the special case of Sub-Saharan Africa, macroeconomic evidence claims that HIV
prevalence level increases with wealth (Bloom et al 2001; Clark and Vencatachellum,
2003; Lachaud, 2007). At the regional level, Lachaud (2007) nds that the regional
disparities in terms of prevalence in a country like Burkina Faso are linked to the
variations in living standards and demonstrates that the level of regional prevalence
increases with wealth and that the result is robust to the choice of proxy used. Clark
and Vencatachellum (2003) explain the positive observed relationship in Africa by
the fact that in industrialized countries, the wage of one agent depends not only
on his own productivity but also on the productivity of his colleagues, reduced by
HIV-infection. Hence if one agent anticipates that most of his colleagues will engage
4in risky behavior and get HIV-infected with a given likelihood, this reduces one's
incentives to self-protect individually. Clark and Vencatachellum (2003) explain the
puzzling relation between GDP and HIV prevalence by what they call the "human-
capital externalities", while in this paper, we propose to explain it by taking into
account another omitted variable, namely GDP volatility.
This paper departs from the previous empirical literature in two ways. Firstly,
from a methodological point of view, we use a dynamic panel data model instead
of country cross-sections to capture country-specic unobserved heterogeneities and
to consider the state-dependent nature of the prevalence rate. Secondly, the cross-
country empirical papers have focused on the rst moment of GDP distribution
while this paper studies the complementary role played by the second moment of
the distribution.
Our work relates to the literature on economic shocks and health outcomes that
has been investigated in the context of the developed countries. Ruhm examines
the role of short-run recessions on health outcomes and documents that economic
downturns improve health in two related papers. In Ruhm (2000), using a panel
dataset of US states over the period 1972-1991, the total mortality rate is found to
decrease with the unemployment rate. In a companion paper, Ruhm (2005) provides
microeconomic evidence that the employment rate increases the prevalence of risky
behaviors such as smoking, obesity and physical inactivity. Using the British House-
hold Panel Survey over 1997-2005, Apouey and Clark (2009) study a sub-sample of
lottery winners and shows that mental health increases with the prize money won,
while this has no statistically signicant eect on general health nor on physical
health outcomes (e.g. diabetes, allergies). Additional results suggest that individ-
uals are more likely to adopt risky behaviors, such as smoking and social drinking,
when they have won a lottery. Adda et al (2008) provide mitigating microeconomet-
ric evidence about the eect of income innovations on health outcomes. Very recent
papers have documented the observed macroeconomic relationship between mortal-
ity and business cycles (see Chen et al, 2010; Gonzalez and Quast, 2010; Svensson
and Kruger, 2010).
The role of shocks on HIV-related behaviors is not yet established. Using panel
data for the youth in Cape Town, Dinkelman et al (2008) investigates how the age
of sexual debut, the recourse of multiple sexual partners and the use of condoms are
sensitive to the shocks experienced by households using an aggregated measurement
of shocks that encompasses job loss, illness and death. The relation is marginally
5signicant suggesting that shocks are not a good predictor of HIV-related behaviors.
However the lack of signicance might be linked to the fact that household shocks
are taken into account instead of personal shocks. One might guess that the relation
would have been statistically signicant when predicting the behaviors of the adults
living in the household instead of the teenagers. The pattern is probably dierent
for adults since they are precisely those who have to face the negative shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple model of individual
choice between safe and unsafe sex to highlight how income instability alters the
incentives to invest in self-protection. This theoretical framework aims to shed some
light on the microeconomic foundations that are behind our empirical investigations.
Section 3 presents the econometric model, the panel data and comments on the
primary results. In section 4, some robustness checks are performed to rule out
the possibility that other mechanisms drive the signicant and positive relation
between income risk and the spread of the epidemic. The framework is applied to
other indicators of economic instability that conrm the ndings that instability
enhances HIV prevalence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Section 5 concludes.
2 Economic Intuitions
The Setting
The crucial link in this line of analysis is the concept of interacting risks. A very
simple model brings out the logics of this problem. Assume that an individual has to
choose between indulging in unprotected sex or not, with the probability of getting
infected from such an intercourse without protection , denoting by  the HIV
prevalence rate among the sexually active population and by , the transmission
rate. This formulation makes the following three implicit assumptions. Firstly, all
infected agents are assumed to engage in exposure2. Secondly, the agent is assumed
to choose one's sexual partner randomly such that the probability of having an
infected partner is equal to the proportion of people living with HIV3. Thirdly,
2This assumption simplies our calculations and does not diminish the insights to be drawn
from the results. Relaxing this assumption leads to more risk taking because with a fraction of
infected agents engaging in safe sex, the probability of encountering an infected partner through
exposure and hence the probability of contracting AIDS falls. A negative feedback of altruism
among infected agents would emerge.
3Formally, the probability of encountering an infected partner is equal to the share of HIV-
infected agents among the people engaged in unsafe sex. The latter encompasses the infected
agents and the proportion of susceptible agents who are risk takers. Likewise this probability is
6perfect matching is assumed, meaning that people opting for unsafe sex match all
together.
To take into account the cost of getting protected, consider that unprotected
sex brings an extra-utility equal to an exogenous . This instantaneous benet
from unsafe sex is a standard assumption in the literature on individual choice in
the presence of HIV/AIDS (Geoard and Philipson 1996; Clark and Vencatachellum
2003). Then, assume that the agent derives utility from income, w, and that infection
is not lethal such that newly infected agents are still alive in the next period as in
Geoard and Philipson (1996), and bear a loss in utility. A state dependent utility
approach is proposed in which the utility is conditional upon the individual's status.
We use the Viscusi and Evans (1990)'s utility formulation in which the utility of
the unhealthy individual is equal to a proportion  of what he would have got if
healthy. Formally, the susceptible agent gets u(w) while the infected counterpart
gets v(w) = u(w), where 0   < 1. u(:) is assumed to be continuous, increasing
and concave. Lastly, assume no discount factor.
Using p as an index for choosing protection and e for exposure to the risk of
being HIV-infected, the following expected utilities are derived from the setting:
EUp = u(w), EUe = +v(w)+[1 ]u(w): Applying a cost-benet framework,
the susceptible agent maximizes her expected utility and invests in self-protection
if the expected utility from protection is higher than that of exposure, i.e. if EUp 
EUe.
Then, she buys self-protection if her willingness to pay for it is higher than its
cost, i.e. if:
(1   )u(w)   (1)
The left-hand side of this expression measures the expected loss in future utility
due to exposure and the right-hand side is the current extra-utility from unsafe sex.
Quite obviously, this individual will choose to get protected when the former is larger
than the latter, and will choose to be exposed otherwise. Varying the parameters
implies that a decrease in the utility loss from infection, in the prevalence rate and
in the transmission rate would lead to lower incentives to use self-protective devices,
and to an increase in HIV-related risk taking behavior.
endogenous and depends on the expected share of risk takers among healthy agents. However, we
argue that the number of agents engaging in unsafe sex whatever their serostatus is approximated
by 1.
7Deriving condition (1) with respect to income, we nd that (1   )u0(w)  0
given that the utility function u(:) is increasing, leading to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Assuming an increasing utility function, an increase in income en-














Figure 1: The Decision to Buy Self-Protection
Figure 1 depicts the cut-o line derived from this simple framework. Graphically,
an increase in income (from w to w0) shifts the cut-o line downward, increasing
the set of people choosing self-protection by the area in dark grey. For a given
loss in utility, 1   , when income increases, a lower prevalence is needed to induce
people to self-protect. We nd that an increase in income leads to more protection
which contradicts with the empirical literature on the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sub-
Saharan Africa where the relation between HIV prevalence and income is shown to
be positive. A puzzle emerges. We aim to disentangle this puzzle by introducing a
risk on income.
The Case of Income Uncertainty
Now, assume that the income is uncertain in the next period and is a random
variable, ~ w, that follows a given cumulative distribution function F on a support
[w;w]. This assertion is motivated by the magnitude of the uctuations in most
African countries and the vulnerability of both individuals and governments to face
such macroeconomic instability.
Denote the expected utility of income by EU(~ w). The expected utilities from
protection and exposure are adjusted as follows. When the agent uses a condom, he
gets EUp = EU(~ w) and faces only the exogenous risk on income. On the contrary,
8when she opts for exposure, she faces both the risk of infection and the exogenous
risk, and thus gets EUe = +EV (~ w)+[1 ]EU(~ w), where EV (~ w) = EU(~ w):
Then, applying the same decision rule as above implies that under income uncer-
tainty, the individual invests in self-protective devices as soon as:
(1   )EU(~ w)   (2)
Certainty vs. Uncertainty
To see how the presence of income uncertainty alters the incentives for self-
protection and to compare the two settings, assume that E(~ w) = w. It follows that
u[E(~ w)] = u(w); from the Jensen's inequality, for any random variable ~ w, if u(.)
is concave, EU(~ w) < u[E(~ w)], i.e. EU(~ w) < u(w). Given that (i) the susceptible
agent takes the risk of infection as soon as u(w) < 
(1 ) (under income certainty)
and that (ii) EU(~ w) < u(w); we obtain that for a given average income, people
are more likely to adopt HIV-related risky behavior under income uncertainty than
under income certainty. Graphically, this increase in risk taking is depicted by the
additional dark grey area in Fig. 2. The presence of income uncertainty shifts the
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Figure 2: The Decision to Buy Self-Protection
in the presence of income uncertainty
Increased Uncertainty
Of more interest in our context is the eect of increased uncertainty surrounding
income on the incentives to adopt self-protective behavior. To analyze this eect, we
examine the consequence of a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of income
of the type proposed in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). A mean preserving spread on
the random variable ~ w has the following eect on condition (2) (1   )EU00(~ w):
9This eect is negative given that the utility function is concave. A rise in income
risk shifts the condition downwards, meaning that the condition under which people
start using condoms is harder to satisfy.
Proposition 2 For a given average income, an increase in the income risk reduces
the incentives to choose protection.
Fig.2 shows that adding a mean-preserving spread, ~ x, on income shifts the cut-
o line upwards, implying a rise in risk taking which is represented in light grey.
Consequently, for a given loss in utility, the prevalence rate needs to be larger to
induce people to buy condoms. Proposition 2 means that the higher the income
uncertainty, the higher the HIV-related risk taking behavior. More risk taking im-
plies an increase in the incidence rate because a given proportion of risk takers will
become newly contaminated, so that the HIV prevalence in the next period will
be higher. In other words, a rise in income uncertainty leads to a faster spread of
the epidemic in a country. The empirical counterpart states that for two countries
having a similar GDP per capita, the HIV prevalence rate will be greater in the
one that exhibits the highest GDP instability. The direct empirical prediction of
this proposition is to test the null hypothesis, H0: controlling for income, income
volatility is positively related to HIV prevalence rate.
3 The Model and the Data
3.1 The Econometric Model
The paper analyzes the relationship between HIV prevalence, income and income
instability by estimating the following dynamic model:
HIVi;t = HIVi;t 1 + 0Incomei;t + 1IncomeRiski + X
0
i;t + i + t + "i;t (3)
HIV is the HIV prevalence rate in country i in year t. The parameters of
interest are the s that capture whether Income and IncomeRisk inuence the
dynamics of the epidemic. Income stands for the GDP per capita and IncomeRisk
for its variability. The set of control variables, Xi;t, includes the constant, the
10literacy rate, the urban population rate and religion. We control for country-specic
eects, i and time eects, t. The country specic eects capture any country
unobserved heterogeneity while the time eects capture the common trend over the
period considered, such as a temporal change in HIV/AIDS-knowledge, in the supply
of self-protection or in mortality.
The dependent variable stands for the stock of HIV-infected individuals among
the adult population. We observe the evolution of the stock over time but we do
not observe the new infections nor the number of people who die and leave the
stock every year. Nevertheless, estimating the stock of infected people in a dynamic
framework consists of predicting the change in the prevalence rate, or, to say it
dierently, the gross incidence rate in contrast with the net incidence rate that
would have taken into account death among HIV-infected people. Controlling for
the lagged prevalence rate, our regression coecients provide insights into the factors
that induce risk taking and hence a more or less rapid propagation of HIV in the
population.
The presence of both the country-specic eect and the lagged dependent vari-
able in the right-hand side leads to the so-called dynamic panel bias that makes the
estimation by Ordinary Least Squares inecient and the elimination of the specic
eects essential. First-dierencing of the equation eliminates the country-specic
eects but makes appear a correlation between the rst-dierence of the lagged
dependent variable, yit 1 and the rst-dierence of the error terms, "it, that
requires the use of instrumental variables. In a panel data setting, the time series
dimension oers the lagged values of the regressors as potential candidates for the in-
struments. Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose using yit 2 or yit 2 as instruments
for yit 1 and estimating the model by the instrumental variable method.
Regarding the low eciency of the Anderson Hsiao estimates, Arellano and Bond
(1991) suggest estimating the model by Generalized Method of Moments rather
than the IV technique, extending the set of instrumental variables to the entire set
of past values and taking into account the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations
of the perturbations. This technique, called the dierence-GMM, has some limita-
tions. Firstly, the rst dierentiation of the equation implies a loss of information.
Secondly, the rst dierence GMM estimator suers from downward bias and low
precision, especially when the value of the autoregressive coecient  increases to-
wards unity (Blundell and Bond 1998).
One alternative approach consists of using both the equations in levels and in
11rst dierences in a system of equations. The system-GMM has the advantage over
the dierence-GMM of identifying the time-invariant regressors and resolving the
limitations listed above, especially because it behaves better than the dierence-
GMM for models where the autoregressive coecient is high (Blundell, Bond and
Windmeijer 2000; Roodman 2006).
3.2 The Data
Our sample consists of 40 countries4 over the period 1990-2007. The sample size
is conditional upon the availability of the data on HIV prevalence, HIV , that is
measured as the proportion of HIV-infected people among the population aged 15-
49 years old and that comes from UNAIDS (2008) estimates. We exploit the latest
UNAIDS dataset that provides a time series of comparable HIV prevalence estimates.
These estimates are comparable across time and across countries while the prevalence
rates from one annual report to another one were not comparable beforehand. The
advantage of this new dataset over the prevalence estimates from the Demographic
and Health Surveys is the time series dimension that allows us to use panel data
models and to exploit the between and within heterogeneities of the data. Even
though UNAIDS estimates are said to be overestimated compared to the population-
based estimates from the Demographic and Health Surveys, they are still comparable
across all the countries of our sample since the way they are computed are similar
across countries. In other words, even though the estimates are upward biased, the
country ranking will remain even after correcting for their measurement error. Table
1 in the appendix reports the data description and sources and Table 2 provides some
descriptive statistics.
Income is taken from the World Developmeent Indicators and is measured as
the gross domestic product per capita in purchasing power parity in constant 2005
international dollars (in thousand). A particular attention has been paid regarding
the endogeneity of the GDP per capita in estimating equation (3). Even though
previous works suggest that the HIV/AIDS epidemic inuences GDP, labor produc-
tivity or growth (e.g. Jamison, Sachs and Wang, 2001; Al-Hmoud and Edwards,
2003; Corrigan et al, 2005; McDonald and Roberts, 2006), the Hausman test will be
in favor of the exogeneity of the variable in each estimation.
4UNAIDS (2008) does not provide HIV estimates for Kenya nor for the Democratic Republic
of Congo.
12To measure the instability in GDP per capita over the period, we apply the
Hodrick and Prescott (1981) lter on the GDP per capita series to generate a non
linear trend equal to a weighted average of the past, current and future values of
the series. The annual cyclical component of the GDP per capita is retrieved by
taking the dierence between the actual value and the trend. This indicator of GDP
uctuations has two main advantages. Firstly, it is detrended in the sense that it
is independent of the mean of the series under consideration. For each country,
the mean of the cyclical component over the period is null. Secondly, taking into
account both the previous and future values of the series avoids the drawback of the
standard coecient of variation that considers only two periods and may lead to a
spurious growth rate5.
Figure 3 charts the GDP per capita and its uctuations over the period for a
sample of countries where the epidemic is more or less widespread. For illustrative
purpose, we use the real gross domestic product per capita in purchasing power
parity, expressed in 2005 US dollars from the Penn World Tables, version 6.3 (Heston
et al, 2009) to have a larger time span. But for the estimation, the GDP series from
the World Development Indicators will be used as it is the most appropriate series
for the developing world. At the end of the period, in 2007, the HIV prevalence
rate is 3.9% in C^ ote d'Ivoire, 1.5% in Mali, 3.1% in Nigeria and 15.3% in Zimbabwe.
We note that the countries dier in two dimensions: rich v.s. poor economies (top
chart) and unstable v.s. stable economies (bottom chart).
In the current analysis, we are interested in estimating the impact of GDP volatil-
ity and not in estimating the impact of GDP uctuations. As a consequence we will
not use the annual uctuations as variable of interest that would give some insights
into the impact of economic shocks. To capture the GDP volatility over time, the
variable IncomeRisk is equal to the standard deviation of the annual deviations
from the trend, as suggested in Hodrick and Prescott (1981). This measure allows
us to capture both the size of the uctuations and their frequency6.
5In the sense that if the GDP increases from t   2 to t   1 by X and then decreases from t   1
to t by Y with Y < X, the state of the economy in t is worse than in t   1 but still better than in
t   2. The standard coecient of variation would tell us that the GDP is reduced while the HP
uctuations would not necessarily do so since it would take into account the past and future values
of the GDP series.
6Note that Equatorial Guinea is excluded from the analysis because it is clearly an outlier in
terms of GDP volatility. The index of GDP volatility is equal to to 2.897 for Equatorial Guinea,
while the average over the whole sample is of 0.168 when Equatorial Guinea is included and 0.102
when excluded from the sample.
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Figure 3: Trend GDP per capita, constant US dollars (PWT 6.3)
The measures of education include the average years of education from Barro and
Lee (2001) and the literacy rate extracted from the World Development Indicators
2005 and 20097. The urban population rate comes from the World Development
Indicators 2009. From the Center for the Study of Global Christianity, three dummy
variables are generated according to the degree of Christianity of the country: (i)
less than 50% of the population is evangelized, (ii) over half of the population is
evangelized but church members stand for less than 60% of the population, (iii)
7Since Barro and Lee (2001) provide measures of education in a 5-year interval basis and given
some missing values in the WDI data, both measures are linearly interpolated over the period
1990-2000 and 1990-2007 respectively.
14church members represent at least 60% of the population and more than 95% of the
population is evangelized.
Before estimating the model, we need to verify that all the variables are sta-
tionary. Unit root tests run country by country have low power given the small
sample (at most 18 years by country), hence we have used panel unit root tests
due to Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003). These are
denoted LLC (2002) and IPS (2003) respectively. Panel unit root tests statistics are
reported in Table 3. The evidence is in favor of the stationarity of HIV prevalence,
our dependent variable, supporting no evidence in favor of the use of cointegration
framework. Accordingly we estimate the HIV prevalence in levels, always controlling
for country and time specic eects.
3.3 Primary Results
Table 4 presents the results from estimating Equation (3) through dierent estima-
tion strategies. Specication 1 estimates the eects of GDP and of GDP instability
on HIV prevalence in a dynamic framework. Columns a, b, and d report alterna-
tively the estimates of a pooled OLS, a xed-eects model, a random-eects model
and a system-GMM. As mentioned above, the estimations reported in rst three
columns should be considered carefully given that they are biased due to the dy-
namic panel bias. The Hausman specication test favored the xed-eects model
over the random-eects model (results not reported here), but the eect of the GDP
instabiliby can be not identied in col.2 since the variable is time-invariant. The
empirical results show a positive and statistically signicant relationship between
GDP volatility and HIV prevalence. When estimating specication 1d, a Hausman
test has been performed to know whether GDP per capita should be considered as
endogenous or exogenous. The Hausman test has been used to compare two esti-
mations, one in which the GDP per capita is assumed exogenous and another one
in which the GDP per capita is assumed endogenous and instrumented by lagged
values of the series (not reported here). The Hausman test fails to be rejected, mean-
ing that the GDP per capita should be considered as exogenous. Accordingly the
column 1d reports the estimates of the model in which GDP per capita is exogenous.
Specication 2 examines the separated eects of GDP and GDP instability on
HIV prevalence by estimating equation (3) with the set of control variables respec-
tively through dierent estimation strategies. Three main ndings are in order.
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minant of HIV prevalence, providing supportive evidence to the prediction of the
model presented above. The higher the GDP volatility, the more widespread is
the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa. The positive and signicant re-
lationship between HIV prevalence and GDP volatility is robust to the inclusion
of control variables such as religion and the rate of urban population. As far as
specications 2b and 2c are concerned, note that a Hausman Test was performed
to compare the random-eects and the xed-eects models and was in favor of the
random-eects specication. In the RE model GDP volatility is positively related
to HIV prevalence but the relation fails to be statistically signicant. Secondly,
empirical nding suggests that the GDP per capita can be assumed exogenous in
estimating the HIV prevalence in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1990-2007.
Indeed the Hausman test (test result not reported here) is in favor of the model in
which GDP per capita is assumed to be exogenous. Column 2d reports the coef-
cients for this model. Thirdly, the GDP appears to have no statistical power in
predicting the HIV prevalence in our dynamic framework. This nding provides
supportive evidence that the second moment of the GDP distribution matters more
than its rst-moment and that the variance of the GDP should be taken into account
when studying the macroeconomic relationship between GDP and the spread of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa.
In terms of economic importance of the relationship between GDP volatility and
HIV prevalence, the point estimates vary between 2.41 (col. 2d) and 3.27 (col.1d).
This means that a one standard deviation increase in the GDP volatility leads to a
rise in HIV prevalence by between 0.32 and 0.43 percentage point.
The rate of urban population is included as a control variable and might have
two competing eects on the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Firstly, it could
be viewed as a proxy for the access to health care facilities. The rate of urban-
ization would capture the fact that a higher urbanization may potentially induce a
lower cost of self-protection given that living in urban areas oers a larger access
to sensitization campaigns and a wider condom availability. Secondly, urbanization
might increase sexual promiscuity as it increases population density and probably
the opportunities to have sex. The rate of urban population fails to be statistically
signicant, suggesting that it has no inuence on the spread of the epidemic as if
neither one of the competing eects dominates.
Religion plays a part in explaining HIV prevalence. By dividing the countries into
16three groups according to their level of Christianity, the estimations suggest that
highly evangelized countries have a higher probability of exhibiting a widespread
epidemic than less evangelized countries. More precisely, the highly evangelized
countries are more aected than the countries where over half of the population is
evangelized but where church members are less than 60% of the population and even
more aected than the countries with less than 50% of the population evangelized.
This result is in line with previous works such as in Gray (2004). Interpreting the
result on religious aliations is twofold. On one hand, Christian people may be more
aected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic because women are more emancipated than in
Muslim societies (the age of rst sex is lower, the number of lifetime sexual partners
is higher). On the other hand, polygyny is more prevalent in Muslim societies
than in Christian societies even though in Sub-Saharan Africa polygyny is not only
related to religious aspects. But, if the percentage of polygamous marriages is higher
among Muslims than among Christians, this would explain why Muslims are less
severely aected by the epidemic than Christians since polygyny is associated with
a lower number of occasional sexual partners and extramarital sexual intercourses,
and hence to a lower risk of HIV-infection.
Table 4 bis re-estimates the benchmark specication 2d using the System-GMM
and controlling for education. We did not include education in the benchmark esti-
mation and decided to run separated estimations due to a large number of missing
values in the series. Each of the two columns uses dierent proxies for education.
Column 1 uses the literacy rate from the World Development Indicators that re-
sponds to the following denition "(The) adult literacy rate is the percentage of
people aged 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short,
simple statement on their everyday life". Over the 453 observations used to esti-
mate the model, the relationship between HIV prevalence and literacy rate fails to
be statistically signicant while the relationship between HIV prevalence and GDP
volatility remains positive and statistically signicant. The positive and statistically
signicant relationship between HIV prevalence and GDP volatility is also robust
when the literacy rate is replaced by the Barro and Lee (2001)'s proportion of peo-
ple aged 25 and over whose highest educational attainment is the primary school
(see col. 2). Note that the coecient of GDP instability increases in size in the
latter specication. This increase could be due to a change in the sample since this
estimation is run over 25 countries only. It could be the case that the relationship
between GDP instability and HIV prevalence is stronger in this sample of countries
17than in the whole sample.
4 Robustness of the Results
The evidence found above suggests two novel ndings. Firstly, when using a dynamic
panel data model and controlling for the second moment of the GDP distribution,
the observed relationship between GDP per capita and HIV prevalence is positive
but it fails to be statistically signicant. Secondly, a more unstable distribution of
GDP leads to a more widespread HIV/AIDS epidemic within Sub-Saharan Africa. In
this section robustness checks are performed to test whether these previous empirical
results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables and to the denition
of income instability. Note that the forthcoming estimations will be compared to
the benchmark estimation which is displayed in Table 4 column 2d. Note also that
the endogeneity of GDP per capita has been tested for all forthcoming estimations
through the Hausman test which was found in favor of the exogeneity of the variable
since it fails to be rejected in each case. Accordingly all reported results come from
specications in which the GDP per capita is assumed to be exogenous.
4.1 Omitted Variables
To test for the robustness of our previous results, we add additional control variables
that are likely to aect both the spread of the epidemic and the GDP instability
and whose omission might lead to biased results.
Degree of Trade Openness
Firstly, we check whether the relationship between HIV prevalence and GDP p.c.
and GDP p.c. volatility remain stable and statistically signicant when controlling
for the degree of trade openness. Openness might be related to both the right-
and left-hand side variables. On the one hand, Oster (2008) and Djemai (2009)
acknowledge that the degree of openness enhances the HIV incidence and individual
risk of HIV-infection, respectively, in Africa. On the other hand, trade openness
is known to induce external risk in a country (e.g. Rodrik, 1998). The degree of
openness, measured as the sum of exports and imports relative to GDP in 2005
constant prices, comes from the Penn World table, version 6.3. In Table 5, column
1 adds the contemporaneous degree of national trade openness to the set of control
18variables used in the benchmark equation. Our estimation result claims that the
omission of the variable trade openness was not driving the benchmark results since
the respective eects of GDP and GDP instability on HIV prevalence are stable
in sign and signicance. Note that the contemporaneous degree of openness is
positively related to HIV but it is not found to be a signicant predictor of HIV
prevalence in this equation.
Ocial Development Aid Flows
We argued that the macroeconomic volatility inuences the spread of the epidemic
through a fall in the incentives to engage in self-protection. Another channel through
which the positive association between prevalence and macroeconomic volatility
might occur is through aid ows. The argument is that more stable countries could
be more likely to receive a large amount of aid ows compared to unstable countries
and these aid ows might be targeted or used by the local government to ght the
epidemic. If such a scenario prevails, then stable economies are less aected by the
epidemic thanks to the aid received and the unstable nations are more aected by
AIDS not due to the income risk as such but due to the induced lack of resources.
To rule out this possibility, we introduce the contemporaneous amount of ocial
development assistance and aid as a control variable. The ocial development as-
sistance and ocial aid in current US dollars comes from the World Development
Indicators 2009 and is expressed in million of US dollars. Column 2 in Table 5 shows
that (i) the eect of GDP per capita is still not statistically signicant, and (ii) its
instability remains signicantly and positively related to HIV prevalence even after
introducing a measure of aid ows. The contemporaneous aid ows fail to explain
signicantly the HIV prevalence. Note that contemporaneous aid ows are found to
be exogenous in our specications, suggesting that the amount of aid is not allocated
in response to the size of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (results not reported here).
Armed Conicts
The third omitted variable that might lead to biased estimates is armed conict.
There are various open channels through which armed conicts might have a role in
our analysis. Firstly, the conict might make the economy of the country sluggish,
leading to a fall in the income level and a rise in the income volatility; this might
be all the more true if the conict is long-lasting. Accordingly, the occurrence of
armed conict might increase the GDP instability that in turn boosts the spread of
the epidemic. If this scenario is validated by the data, one should nd that armed
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ict increases the HIV prevalence and the eect on the signicance of GDP
instability is unclear. Secondly, one might argue that income instability has nothing
to do with HIV prevalence and gains its signicance from the omission of the conict
variable in the sense that armed conicts have their own impact on prevalence since
the bleak prospects due to being in conict might induce people to be more likely
to engage in risky sexual behavior. If this scenario was validated by the data, one
would get that income instability is not signicant anymore and that the likelihood
of experiencing an armed conict is positively and signicantly associated to HIV
prevalence. Thirdly, as suggested in Miguel et al (2004), economic instability might
be considered as a cause of conict rather than a consequence and this would indicate
that income instability leads to conict that in turn could inuence the spread of
the epidemic.
The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict dataset (Gleditsch et al, 2002; Harbom and
Wallensteen, 2009) provides very disaggregated data such that we are able to control
for whether the sample countries experience an armed conict for each year over
1990-2007 and to distinguish whether the conict is against the government in place
or due to territory-based issues. Two dummy variables are generated from this
dataset, according to whether the country is experiencing a conict against the
government or for territory issues.
Specications 3 and 4 report the results and suggest that the purpose of the
conict leads to two dierent conclusions. On the one hand, conict for territory
purposes has no eect on the spread of the epidemic and its inclusion among the set
of control variables does not aect the relationships between HIV prevalence and
GDP instability. On the other hand, armed conict against the government leads
to a fall in the HIV prevalence and its inclusion implies that GDP instability loses
its predictive power. Nevertheless, neither of the proposed alternative channel is
validated by the data. Here the relation goes in the opposite direction since we found
a negative relation between being in armed conict against the government and
prevalence. This observed relationship suggests that the mechanisms that prevail
are either reduced mobility and opportunity to have sex due to conict, or excess
mortality of people living with HIV among the fatalities, or a mixture of the two.
Lastly, concerning the connection with Miguel et al (2004), we do not nd that
income instability increases the likelihood of conict that in turn increases the HIV
prevalence for two reasons. Firstly, the two relationships are not consistent, we
should have found that the relation between instability and prevalence and the one
20between conict and prevalence go in the same direction. Secondly, the results
dier according to the conict purpose and there is no a priori reason why income
instability should trigger conicts against the government more so than conicts
for territory-based issues. Lastly note that the Arellano-bond tests for rst- and
second- order serial correlation in rst dierences fail to be rejected in the estimations
displayed in col. 3 and 4, suggesting that the conclusions should be taken with
caution.
4.2 Dierent measures of income volatility
This subsection aims at testing whether the relationship between income instability
and HIV prevalence remains positive and statistically signicant when other proxies
for income instability are used. We propose to use another indicator for the GDP
per capita instability and to base the measure of income volatility on aggregates
other than the GDP per capita.
GDP in constant 2000 US dollars Firstly, we estimate the same model
as in Table 4 col. 2d except that we replace the GDP series in the GDP in level
and the measure of GDP instability. In the benchmark equation, the GDP per
capita in purchasing power parity was used and in the col. 1 of Table 6 we use the
GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars. Similar results are found since (i) the
coecient of GDP per capita fails to be statistically signicant, (ii) GDP instability
has a positive and statistically signicant impact on HIV growth, and (iii) GDP per
capita can be assumed exogenous in this model. Then, we can conclude that our
core results were not subject to the estimation of the purchasing power parities.
Normalized GDP uctuations One might argue that by denition, the
richer the country, the greater are its uctuations. This could be the case with
other measures of uctuations. In the previous sections we used the annual devi-
ations from the trend to compute the indicator of volatility and by denition, the
non linear trend is generated given the past and future values of the series and there
is no a priori reason why the trend should be further from the actual values for the
rich countries compared to the poor ones. Nevertheless we propose to normalize the
annual deviations from the trend, to compute the standard deviation of the normal-
ized series for each country of the sample and to estimate its eect on the spread of
the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa. Column 2 in Table 6 displays the
21empirical results and shows that the coecient of GDP volatility is robust in terms
of sign and statistical signicance to this change of denition.
Volatility in agricultural yields
GDP is an indicator of standards of living and gives some insights into the potential
public investment. Nevertheless, in most African countries, the majority of the
population is working in the elds while agriculture is not very productive, so that
it accounts for a small proportion of GDP. For instance, in 2000, in Zambia, 72% of
the population was working in agriculture while the share of the agricultural sector
in GDP is only 22% (WDI, 2009). The remaining 78% come from other sources and
one might guess that their prots do not benet directly the wide majority of the
population. Farmers might have access to these resources through public spending if
they are used to nance social programs but they do not constitute individual wealth
as such. This example is representative of most countries within Sub-Saharan Africa.
In this context, investigating the role of the volatility in agricultural yields provides
some additional insights into the relationship between economic instability and the
spread of the epidemic. The cereal yields, measured in kg per hectare, come from
the World Development Indicators 2009. The measure of volatility in yields is the
standard deviation of the annual deviations of the agricultural yields from their
trend using the Hodrick Prescott non linear trend.
Col. 3 repeats the benchmark regression replacing the volatility in GDP by
the volatility in yields as the independent variable of interest. The evidence shows
a positive association between the variance of the uctuations in yields and the
prevalence of HIV. Countries in which yields are highly volatile are much more
aected by the epidemic than their counterparts. High and frequent crop shocks
discourage people to invest in self-protective behavior, all the more so when the vast
majority of the population who works in the agricultural sector has no outside option
to avoid crop shocks and their livelihoods are directly aected by these uctuations
in yields. As in the benchmark estimation, GDP per capita turns out to have no
predictive power.
Col. 4 and 5 in Table 6 studies the heterogeneous eects of the volatility in yields
according to the share of the agricultural sector in GDP. The share of agriculture in
GDP comes from the World Development Indicators 2009. We compute two types
of median from this series. The rst measure is computed yearly and is used to
generated a dummy variable, below1, equal to one if the country share is below
22the median and zero otherwise. This measure takes into account the fact that the
share of agriculture in GDP varies a lot over the studied period for some sampled
countries. The greatest amplitudes are found in Uganda (and Liberia) where the
minimum value is 24 (51) and the maximum value reaches 57 (94). Accordingly, this
measure allows some countries to appear below the median in some years and above
in others. The second median is computed from the country share of agriculture in
GDP averaged over the whole period and determines two distinct sets of countries:
one being below the median over the entire time period and the other being above
the median. Likewise the dummy variable, below2, will take the value one in the
former case and zero in the latter.
Included in the right-hand side variables are not only the volatility in yields but
also the interaction between the volatility in yields and the dummy variable for being
below the median. The overall coecient turns out to be statistically insignicant
while the coecient of volatility in yields is statistically signicant and positive for
the countries below the median. A Wald test tests for the equality between these
two coecients and fails to reject the null hypothesis of equality, indicating that
the eect of agricultural risk is homogeneous across countries whether the national
wealth is highly based on agriculture or not. A second Wald test shows that the
two coecients are jointly statistically signicant, providing additional support to
the empirical results displayed in Col. 3.
Lastly, we replace GDP per capita in level by the measure of agricultural yields
to control for another type of income (see col. 6). Similar qualitative ndings are
in order: (i) the eect of agricultural yields is not statistically signicant, (ii) the
volatility in yields matters in explaining the spread of AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Volatility in precipitation
Lastly, we propose to construct a measure of income instability based upon rainfall,
claiming that rainfall is an exogenous proxy for income and in particular individual
wealth given that the large majority of the population is working in the agricultural
sector. The rainfall data we use come from Miguel et al (2004)'s dataset that ends
up in 2001 and comes from the Normalized Dierence Vegetation Index dataset.
The standard deviation of the annual rainfall index is used as an alternative proxy
for income instability. Equation (3) is estimated replacing the volatility in GDP
p.c. by the volatility in rainfalls. Note that this specication could be considered as
23an instrumental variable specication in reduced-form given that rainfall stands for
an exogenous source of GDP. The empirical results displayed in Col. 7 conrm the
previous ndings, as the volatility in rainfall is signicantly and positively related
to the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa. Note that in this
specication of the model, the GDP per capita has still no predictive power and is
found to be exogenous.
The estimation in Col. 7 is performed on the 1990-2001 time period given the
availability of the data on rainfall. If we estimate the eect of the volatility over the
period 1990-2001 on HIV prevalence over the whole time period (1990-2007), the
eect is still positive and statistically signicant (not reported here).
5 Concluding remarks
This paper addresses the issue of the positive observed relationship between income
and HIV prevalence in Sub-Saharan Africa. It goes one step further and examines
whether volatility of income plays a role in the spread of the epidemic. The answer
is yes. The empirical results provide support to the view that a greater spread
distribution of GDP per capita leads to faster spread of the epidemic over time.
The eect turns out to be huge since empirical ndings suggest that a one standard
deviation increase in GDP volatility leads to an rise in HIV prevalence by between
0.32 and 0.43 percentage point. The observed pattern is suggested to be driven by
the fall in the opportunity cost of HIV-infection resulting from a high macroeconomic
instability. The incentives to invest in self-protective devices are the key element of
our analysis and are found to decrease with income volatility.
The paper is based on the central hypothesis that nowadays, HIV-infection is a
matter of choice and incentives. Of course, not all Africans have perfect knowledge
about the risk of HIV-contamination (see among others, Glick and Sahn, 2007),
about how to use condoms properly and some individuals, particularly women, have
no power to negotiate on sexuality issues. However previous studies show that the
acquisition of HIV/AIDS-knowledge and access to condoms are necessary but not
sucient to induce people to use self-protective devices or to engage in safer practices
(e.g. Dinkelman et al, 2006; Djemai, 2009).
Even though individual data would have been more appealing to predict indi-
vidual behavior towards the risk of HIV-infection and to test the prediction of the
24model, macroeconomic data is used for two reasons. Firstly, there is no individual-
level data that provide both information about HIV-related behavior and historical
information about the household revenues or consumption that would allow us to
construct an index of income instability. Secondly microeconomic data would have
the disadvantage of suering from an endogeneity bias in the relationship of interest.
Indeed, one's own HIV-status does not inuence the gross domestic product while
the GDP might inuence one's risk taking behavior and one's own status might in-
uence one's revenue due to the loss of productivity and the opportunistic diseases
that a HIV-infected individual is likely to develop. Microeconomic data would have
the second disadvantage of suering from large measurement errors and misreport-
ing (e.g. Gersovitz et al, 1998; Gersovitz, 2005). The collection of survey data on
both vulnerability to risk and on HIV/AIDS-related behavior and prevalence would
provide some additional insights about the role of instability on HIV-related risk
taking.
Should policy implications have to be drawn from our work, we would say the
following. Our ndings suggest that a new approach to ght the HIV/AIDS epidemic
could be based on providing people more incentives to invest in health care and to
use the self-protective devices that are available to them. One way to enhance HIV-
related protection is to protect the agents against income risk, either by reducing
the probability of facing such a risk or by reducing the amount of damage in the
case of risk occurrence. Secondly, our paper suggests that business cycle can have a
deteriorating eect on individual health care, that in turn lead to the spread of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa. The cost of business cycle was found
to be negligible for developed economies while in the context of this paper, we can
conclude that it would be worth exploring their eects on African countries and
societies, all the more so that the size of the eect is found to be non negligible.
This paper focuses on income risk and is an attempt to open the debate about the
role of risk in lowering the incentives to invest in self-protective behavior. This issue
could be tackled in a broader perspective. On the one hand, the framework might
be applied to other exogenous risks the agents are likely to face in their everyday life
and against which they can not protect, such as political instability, new epidemics,
massacres or expropriation. On the other hand, the framework is replicable to
other self-protective behaviors such as water ltering, the use of mosquito nets or
vaccination. These self-protective behaviors have the common particularity that
agents do not massively adopt them even though the cost of self-protection is low
25and the agents are informed about the health risks in case of non-adoption.
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Variable Denition, Unit Source
HIV prevalence Rate of the adult population (15-49) who is living UNAIDS (2008)
with HIV/AIDS, percent
GDP per capita GDP per capita, in thousand, ppp WDI
Yields Agricultural yields, in kg per hectare WDI
Rainfall Annual rainfall estimates NDVI
Aid ows Ocial development assistance and ocial aid, in WDI
million of current US dollars
Agriculture over GDP Share of the agricultural sector in GDP WDI
Urban Rate of urban population, percent WDI
Literacy rate Rate of the adult population (15 and older) who is WDI
literate, percent
Primary educ. Adult population (15 and older) whose educational Barro and Lee (2001)
attainment is primary, percent
Trade openness Sum of imports and exports over GDP Penn world Table 6.3
Christianitylow DV equals one if low degree of Christianity Center for the
Christianitymiddle DV equals one if intermediate degree of Christianity Study of Global
Christianityhigh DV equals one if high degree of Christianity Christianity
30TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
HIV prevalence 738 5.23 6.66 0 28.9
GDP per capita 752 2.122 3.305 .151 28.876
GDP risk 738 .102 .129 .015 .590
Yields 756 1,091.74 490.68 111 3,307
Yields risk 756 146.54 93.90 10.56 369.09
Rainfall volatility 501 286.06 143.10 43.02 720.97
Literacy rate 498 55.61 21.03 11.4 91
Primary educ. 299 34.68 13.03 9.6 59
Aid ows (in millions) 771 448.46 639.74 -11.03 11431.76
Trade openness 774 70.86 38.98 1.09 230.19
Agriculture over GDP 728 29.81 16.84 2 94
Rate of urban pop. 774 34.24 16.36 5 87
Christianitylow 774 .233 0 1
Christianitymiddle 774 .419 0 1
Christianityhigh 774 .349 0 1
TABLE 3
Panel unit root tests
Levels First dierences
IPS LLC IPS LLC
HIV -4.262*** -17.032*** -2.146*** -11.417***
GDP p.c. 1.149 15.176 -1.665* -1.298
Yields -1.645* -1.560* -2.630*** 3.749
Urban pop. -0.986 -1.809** -3.311*** -5.064***
Openness -1.443 -0.236 -2.531*** -1.910**
Aid ows -0.926 7.798 -1.924*** 14.858
Note: IPS and LLC are the t   bar test statistic for the unit root null hypothesis of the Im,
Pesaran and Shin (2003) and the Levin, Lin, Chu (2002) t   star for the presence of unit root
in the model. Both tests are performed for the variables of the model, expressed either in
levels or in rst-dierences. **, *** signify rejection of the unit root hypothesis at
the 5% and 1% level respectively. A lag length of 2 lags is specied and the Augmented
Dickey Fuller regression has an intercept only. When the test is performed for the variable
in levels and the evidence rejects the null hypothesis, the variable is shown to be stationary
and can be used in levels in the estimation. When the evidence fails to reject the unit root
null hypothesis, the test is performed for the variable in rst dierences and if the null































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































HIV prevalence and GDP p.c. volatility: controlling for literacy





GDP p.c. -1.018 1.926
(0.926) (2.776)


















Country eects yes yes
Time eects yes yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Excluded dummy variable:
Christianityhigh. m1 and m2 are Arellano-Bond test for rst-order
and second-order serial correlation in rst dierences
33TABLE 5
HIV prevalence and GDP p.c. volatility: additional explanatory variables
Dependent variable: HIV prevalence
With trade openness With aid ows With conict
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Syst-GMM Syst-GMM Syst-GMM Syst-GMM
HIVt 1 1.004*** 1.004*** 1.003*** 0.974***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
GDP p.c. 0.0759 -0.109 0.144 0.696
(0.909) (0.935) (0.877) (0.894)
GDP pc. risk 2.435* 2.714* 2.380* -0.211
(1.421) (1.400) (1.384) (1.303)
Urbanpop 0.0596 0.116 0.0581 0.0560
(0.176) (0.174) (0.174) (0.208)
Christianitylow -0.566 -0.548 -0.521 -1.312**
(0.490) (0.488) (0.461) (0.552)
Christianitymiddle -0.474 -0.449 -0.427 -1.178***









constant -0.0192 -0.128 -0.0589 1.072**
(0.380) (0.395) (0.369) (0.426)
m1 2.23** 2.09** -1.07 -1.07
m2 2.53** 2.26** -1.19 -1.19
N 659 656 659 659
Country 39 39 39 39
Country eects yes yes yes yes
Time eects yes yes yes yes
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. Excluded dummy variable: Christianityhigh
m1 and m2 are Arellano-Bond test for rst-order and second-order serial correlation in rst dierences
34T
A
B
L
E
6
H
I
V
p
r
e
v
a
l
e
n
c
e
a
n
d
G
D
P
p
.
c
.
v
o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
y
:
a
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
o
f
i
n
c
o
m
e
v
o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
y
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
H
I
V
p
r
e
v
a
l
e
n
c
e
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
S
y
s
t
-
G
M
M
S
y
s
t
-
G
M
M
S
y
s
t
-
G
M
M
S
y
s
t
-
G
M
M
S
y
s
t
-
G
M
M
S
y
s
t
-
G
M
M
S
y
s
t
-
G
M
M
H
I
V
t
 
1
0
.
9
9
6
*
*
*
1
.
0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.
9
3
4
*
*
*
0
.
9
0
1
*
*
*
0
.
9
0
1
*
*
*
0
.
9
4
2
*
*
*
1
.
0
1
0
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
1
3
)
(
0
.
0
1
2
)
(
0
.
0
2
1
)
(
0
.
0
2
8
)
(
0
.
0
3
3
)
(
0
.
0
1
9
)
(
0
.
0
2
9
)
G
D
P
p
.
c
.
0
.
0
7
2
5
1
.
2
4
6
0
.
1
7
8
0
.
3
4
3
0
.
3
7
3
(
0
.
9
1
0
)
(
1
.
1
5
8
)
(
0
.
9
5
5
)
(
1
.
0
5
3
)
(
0
.
9
3
4
)
G
D
P
p
c
r
i
s
k
(
n
o
r
m
a
l
i
z
e
d
)
1
.
1
1
7
*
(
0
.
6
5
8
)
G
D
P
p
.
c
.
2
0
0
0
U
S
D
0
.
0
2
8
8
(
2
.
8
9
6
)
G
D
P
p
c
.
2
0
0
0
U
S
D
r
i
s
k
8
.
5
6
3
*
*
(
3
.
9
5
1
)
Y
i
e
l
d
s
0
.
0
0
0
0
9
(
0
.
0
0
0
)
Y
i
e
l
d
s
r
i
s
k
(
a
)
0
.
0
0
7
0
*
*
*
0
.
0
0
3
1
0
.
0
0
2
0
0
.
0
0
6
3
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
3
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
(
0
.
0
0
3
)
b
e
l
o
w
1

Y
i
e
l
d
s
r
i
s
k
(
b
)
0
.
0
0
6
0
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
b
e
l
o
w
2

Y
i
e
l
d
s
r
i
s
k
(
b
)
0
.
0
0
6
6
*
*
(
0
.
0
0
3
)
R
a
i
n
f
a
l
l
v
o
l
a
t
i
l
i
t
y
0
.
0
0
3
2
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
m
1
2
.
4
1
*
*
2
.
4
5
*
*
-
0
.
1
3
-
0
.
8
5
0
.
0
7
0
.
0
5
-
0
.
2
4
m
2
2
.
5
8
*
*
2
.
6
0
*
*
*
1
.
8
1
*
1
.
4
8
2
.
1
0
*
*
2
.
1
0
*
*
2
.
5
3
*
*
N
6
5
9
6
5
9
6
5
9
6
3
5
6
5
9
6
8
0
4
2
7
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
3
9
3
9
3
9
3
9
3
9
4
0
3
9
O
t
h
e
r
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
e

e
c
t
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
T
i
m
e
e

e
c
t
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
y
e
s
W
a
l
d
t
e
s
t
(
p
v
a
l
u
e
)
H
0
:

a
=

b
.
3
6
7
.
2
6
8
H
0
:

a
=

b
=
0
.
0
0
3
.
0
0
8
N
o
t
e
:
R
o
b
u
s
t
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
e
d
a
t
t
h
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
l
e
v
e
l
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
*
p
<
0
:
1
0
,
*
*
p
<
0
:
0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
:
0
1
b
e
l
o
w
1
i
s
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
o
n
e
i
f
t
h
e
s
h
a
r
e
o
f
t
h
e
a
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
o
v
e
r
G
D
P
i
s
b
e
l
o
w
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
m
e
d
i
a
n
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
d
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
w
h
o
l
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
a
n
d
z
e
r
o
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
.
b
e
l
o
w
2
i
s
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
o
n
e
i
f
t
h
e
s
h
a
r
e
o
f
a
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
o
v
e
r
G
D
P
i
s
b
e
l
o
w
t
h
e
m
e
d
i
a
n
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
d
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
e
n
t
i
r
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
/
y
e
a
r
s
a
m
p
l
e
.
35